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Division in the Illinois Appellate Court: What
is the Appropriate Standard of Review for
Alleged Prosecutorial Misconduct During
Closing Argument?
BY RYAN T. HARDING1
The Illinois Appellate Court is divided on whether to apply de novo review or an abuse of discretion standard when evaluating alleged prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument. This article concludes that de novo
review is the proper standard of review under current Illinois law. However,
as a matter of policy, this article recommends that (1) abuse of discretion
review should normally apply to the trial court's determination that a defendant was not substantially prejudiced by the State's closing argument; (2) de
novo review should apply when the trial court's determination that a defendant was not substantially prejudiced turned on a pure question of law; and
(3) the plain error doctrine should apply when the defendant fails to preserve
the issue of whether he was substantially prejudiced by the State's closing
argument.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Illinois Appellate Court is divided over the appropriate standard of
review for evaluating alleged prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument.2 Currently, the First and Third Divisions of the First District have applied an abuse of discretion standard while the Third and Fourth Districts and
the Fifth Division of the First District have applied de novo review.3 This
article evaluates the origin and effect of this division and ultimately concludes that de novo is the proper standard of review under current Illinois
law.
However, as a matter of policy, this article recommends that (1) abuse
of discretion review should normally apply to the trial court's determination
that a defendant was not substantially prejudiced by the State's closing argument; (2) de novo review should apply when the trial court's determination
that a defendant was not substantially prejudiced turned on a pure question
of law; and (3) the plain error doctrine should apply when the defendant fails
to preserve the issue of whether he was substantially prejudiced by the State's
closing argument. Adopting this three-pronged approach would clarify Illinois law while serving important policy goals.
II.BACKGROUND
This section begins by examining the structure of the Illinois judiciary.
This section then reviews the law governing closing arguments and discusses
when a prosecutor’s closing argument is improper. This section will then discuss how courts review forfeited issues under the plain error doctrine. This
2.
3.

See People v. Green, 2017 IL App (1st) 152513, ¶ 78.
Id. at ¶ 80.
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section will end by thoroughly examining the current division of authority in
the Illinois Appellate Court regarding the appropriate standard of review
when examining the propriety of the State's closing argument.
A.

STRUCTURE OF THE ILLINOIS JUDICIARY

The Illinois judiciary is comprised of a circuit court, appellate court, and
supreme court.4 The circuit court, known informally as the trial court, is a
court of general jurisdiction and hears a wide variety of civil and criminal
cases.5 The Illinois Appellate Court is a court of intermediate review.6 This
court is divided into five districts.7 Cook County comprises the entire First
District and is divided into six divisions.8 The Chicago suburbs and northwest
Illinois are in the Second District, and downstate Illinois is within the Third,
Fourth, and Fifth District.9 The Illinois Supreme Court is the highest court in
the State of Illinois.10
B.

IMPROPER CLOSING ARGUMENTS

Closing arguments allow the State and the defense a final opportunity
to review with the jury the admitted evidence, discuss what the evidence
means, apply the law to that evidence, and argue why the evidence and the
law compel a favorable verdict.11 Generally, prosecutors are given wide latitude during closing argument.12 The prosecutor has the right to comment on
the evidence and all reasonable inferences from the evidence, even if this is
unfavorable to the defendant.13 The prosecutor may also respond to comments invited by the defense.14 However, closing argument must serve a purpose beyond inflaming the emotions or prejudices of the jury.15 Likewise, it

4. ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 1.
5. ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 9.
6. See ILL. CONST. art. VI, §§ 5-6.
7. Illinois Appellate Court General Information, ILL. COURTS (2018), http://illinoiscourts.gov/AppellateCourt/AppGenInfoDefault.asp [https://perma.cc/FXE9-KESY]; see
People v. Layhew, 564 N.E.2d 1232, 1238-39, 139 Ill. 2d 476, 489 (Ill. 1990) (“[T]here is but
one appellate court within the State of Illinois [notwithstanding the court being divided into
different districts].”).
8. See Map of Illinois Judicial Districts, ILL. COURTS (2018), http://illinoiscourts.gov/AppellateCourt/DistrictMap.asp [https://perma.cc/3434-YFQK].
9. See id.
10. See generally ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 1.
11. People v. Nicholas, 842 N.E.2d 674, 685 (Ill. 2005).
12. People v. Hampton, 899 N.E.2d 532, 544 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st 2008).
13. Id.
14. People v. Willis, 997 N.E.2d 947, 970 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st 2013).
15. People v. Wheeler, 871 N.E.2d 728, 748 (Ill. 2007).
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is improper for the prosecutor to misstate the evidence, misstate the law, or
argue facts not in evidence.16
Improper comments during closing argument are reversible error only
when they cause substantial prejudice to the defendant.17 Substantial prejudice occurs when the improper statements were a material factor in the defendant's conviction.18 Improper statements are a material factor if (1) the
jury could have reached a contrary verdict had the improper comments not
been made or (2) the reviewing court cannot say that the prosecutor's improper remarks did not contribute to the defendant's conviction.19 The
strength of the evidence against the defendant is often a decisive factor when
determining whether the improper statements were a material factor.20 For
example, in People v. Alvidez, the prosecutor's improper statement was not a
material factor in defendant's conviction because the improper comment was
on a collateral matter and “the medical evidence proffered by the State was
more than compelling evidence of defendant's guilt.”21
Whether a prosecutor's closing argument caused substantial prejudice is
evaluated according to the language used, its relation to the evidence, and the
effect of the argument on the defendant's right to a fair and impartial trial.22
Closing arguments must be viewed in their entirety, and the complained of
comments must be viewed in the proper context.23 Generally, the trial court
cures any prejudice arising from closing argument by instructing the jury that
closing arguments are not evidence and to disregard any argument not based
on the evidence.24 Likewise, a prosecutor's misstatement of the law during
closing argument does not normally constitute reversible error if the trial
court properly instructs the jury on the law.25
16. People v. Smith, 565 N.E.2d 900, 908 (Ill. 1990); People v. Chavez, 762 N.E.2d
553, 563 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st 2001).
17. People v. Thompson, 997 N.E.2d 681, 696 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st 2013).
18. People v. Harris, 74 N.E.3d 1, 13-14 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st 2017).
19. Wheeler, 871 N.E.2d at 745.
20. See Harris, 74 N.E.3d at 14 (stating that improper statements were not a material
factor “in light of the ample, if not overwhelming, additional evidence that supported a finding
of the defendant's guilt”); see also Wheeler, 871 N.E.2d at 749 (“We believe that in a case like
this, relying heavily on the credibility of the testifying police witnesses, the prosecutor's utilization of closing arguments to inflame the passions and prejudices of the jury constituted a
material factor in defendant's conviction.”); see also People v. Johnson, 803 N.E.2d 405, 44142 (Ill. 2003) (“We note that the evidence in this case was not closely balanced. The jury had
before it [defendant's] confession, physical evidence[,] . . . and the uncontradicted testimony
of an eyewitness to the shooting. . . . In sum, the prosecutor's comments, quite simply, did not
result in substantial prejudice to [defendant] under these circumstances[.]”).
21. People v. Alvidrez, 21 N.E.3d 720, 729-30 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st 2014).
22. Hampton, 899 N.E.2d at 544-45.
23. Id. at 546-47.
24. Wheeler, 871 N.E.2d at 748.
25. People v. Jackson, 974 N.E.2d 855, 870 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st 2012).
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PRESERVED VS. UNPRESERVED ERRORS

To preserve a claim of prosecutorial misconduct for review, a defendant
must object to the offending statements both at trial and in a written post-trial
motion.26 At the post-trial hearing, the trial court determines if the comments
caused substantial prejudice to the defendant.27
If a defendant fails to preserve his claim, the purported error is forfeited.28 However, the plain error doctrine bypasses normal forfeiture principles and allows a reviewing court to consider an unpreserved error when (1)
the evidence is close, regardless of the seriousness of the error or (2) the error
is serious, regardless of the closeness of the evidence.29
Under the plain error doctrine, the defendant must first show that a clear
or obvious error occurred.30 Next, the defendant must satisfy either the first
or second prong of the plain error doctrine.31 Under the first prong, the defendant must prove that the evidence was so closely balanced that the error
alone severely threatened to tip the scales of justice against him.32 Under the
second prong, the defendant must prove that the error was so serious that it
affected the fundamental fairness of his trial and challenged the integrity of
the judicial process.33 The defendant bears the burden of persuasion at all
times.34
D.

DIVISION IN THE ILLINOIS APPELLATE COURT

The Illinois Appellate Court is currently divided over the appropriate
standard of review when reviewing the propriety of the State's closing argument.35 For example, the First and Third Divisions of the First District have
applied an abuse of discretion standard while the Third and Fourth Districts
and the Fifth Division of the First District have applied de novo review.36 The
Second District and various divisions of the First District have recognized
this split of authority but have failed to settle the issue.37 This subsection will
evaluate the origin of this division and will then discuss the current division
of authority within the Illinois Appellate Court.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Id. at 868.
See People v. Love, 878 N.E.2d 789, 795 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st 2007).
People v. Sebby, 89 N.E.3d 675, 687 (Ill. 2017).
People v. Herron, 830 N.E.2d 467, 479-80 (Ill. 2005).
People v. Hillier, 931 N.E.2d 1184, 1187 (Ill. 2010).
See id.
People v. Thompson, 939 N.E.2d 403, 413 (Ill. 2010).
Id. at 413-14.
Id.
Green, 2017 IL App (1st) 152513, at ¶ 78.
Id. at ¶ 80.
See id.
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i. Origin of the Division
This division began with apparent confusion over two Illinois Supreme
Court cases: People v. Wheeler and People v. Blue.38 In Blue, the defendant
argued that prosecutors made improper statements during closing argument
when they said that the jury needed to “send a message” to the victim’s family.39 The Illinois Supreme Court first noted that the defendant failed to
properly preserve this issue because, although he objected at trial, he failed
to file a post-trial motion.40 Nonetheless, in reviewing the propriety of these
statements, the Blue Court applied an abuse of discretion standard, noting
that the “regulation of the substance and style of the closing argument is
within the trial court's discretion, and the trial court's determination of the
propriety of these remarks will not be disturbed absent a clear abuse of discretion.”41
In Wheeler, the prosecutor made improper statements during closing argument.42 The defendant objected to many of the improper statements, and
the trial court overruled some of those objections.43 The Illinois Supreme
Court held that the defendant preserved the issue for appeal.44 When reviewing the propriety of statements, the Court noted “[w]hether statements made
by a prosecutor at closing argument were so egregious that they warrant a
new trial is a legal issue this court reviews de novo.”45
Nonetheless, the Wheeler Court did not explicitly overrule or distinguish Blue, which held that the propriety of closing statements are subject to
an abuse of discretion standard.46 Adding further complexity, the Wheeler
Court cited approvingly to Blue for areas of law other than the standard of
review.47
ii. Division in the Illinois Appellate Court
Following the decision in Wheeler, a split of authority occurred within
the Illinois Appellate Court. In People v. Love, the defendant argued that a

38. Id. at ¶ 79.
39. People v. Blue, 724 N.E.2d 920, 934 (Ill. 2000).
40. Id.
41. Id. at 935 (citing People v. Byron, 647 N.E.2d 946, 954 (Ill. 1995)).
42. Wheeler, 871 N.E.2d at 748-49.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 745 (noting that defendant properly preserved some of the improper closing
arguments and that the court would then consider the entirety of the prosecutor’s closing statement).
45. Id. at 744 (citing People v. Graham, 795 N.E.2d 231, 237 (Ill. 2003)).
46. See Wheeler, 871 N.E.2d at 744.
47. See id. at 744, 749.
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prosecutor tried to mislead the jury during closing argument.48 The Illinois
Appellate Court, First District, First Division concluded that the defendant
had properly preserved this claim and applied an abuse of discretion standard
when reviewing the trial court's determination.49 The court ultimately concluded that the prosecutor's comments were not improper and affirmed the
conviction.50
In People v. McCoy, the defendant argued that the prosecutor made improper statements during closing argument.51 The Illinois Appellate Court,
Third District found that the defendant had failed to properly preserve this
issue.52 Nonetheless, the court evaluated the purported error under the plain
error doctrine.53 Applying de novo review, the court found that the prosecutor
misstated the law during closing argument.54 Because the evidence was
closely balanced in this case and because the statement was a clear error, the
court reversed defendant's conviction and remanded the case for a new trial.55
In People v. Averett, the defendant objected to the State's closing argument at trial.56 The trial court overruled the objection.57 However, the defendant failed to properly preserve the issue because he failed to file a post-trial
motion.58 The Illinois Appellate Court, First District, Third Division applied
the plain error doctrine to review this unpreserved issue.59 The court then
applied an abuse of discretion standard to review the trial court's decision.60
The court ultimately concluded that the statements were not improper and
that, even if they were improper, they did not rise to the level of a clear error.61 The court therefore affirmed the conviction.62
In People v. Palmer, the defendant did not object to the State's closing
argument.63 Defendant appealed his conviction, arguing that the State's closing argument was improper.64 The Illinois Appellate Court, Fourth District
reviewed the purported error under the plain error doctrine.65 The court
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Love, 878 N.E.2d at 795.
Id. at 796.
Id. at 797.
People v. McCoy, 881 N.E.2d 621, 631-32 (Ill. App. Ct. 3d 2008).
Id. at 631.
Id. at 633.
Id.
Id.
People v. Averett, 886 N.E.2d 1123, 1128-30 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st 2008).
Id.
Id. at 1129.
Id.
Id. at 1129-30 (citing Love, 878 N.E.2d at 796).
Averett, 886 N.E.2d at 1128-30.
Id. at 1129 (citing Love, 878 N.E.2d at 796).
People v. Palmer, 889 N.E.2d 244, 252 (Ill. App. Ct. 4th 2008).
See id.
Id.
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applied de novo review when evaluating the propriety of the prosecutor's
statements and ultimately concluded that no error occurred.66
In People v. Ramos, the defendant argued that the prosecutor made improper statements during closing argument.67 However, because he did not
object to this purported error at trial, the Illinois Appellate Court, First District, Fifth Division reviewed the argument under the plain error doctrine.68
The court used de novo review to examine the propriety of the prosecutor's
statements, ultimately concluding that the prosecutor's statements were
proper.69
iii. Recognizing, But Not Resolving, the Division
In People v. Johnson, the defendant argued that a prosecutor's remarks
during closing argument constituted reversible error.70 However, defendant
failed to preserve the issue for appeal because he failed to object to the statements at trial.71 The Illinois Appellate Court, First District, First Division
recognized that “[i]t is not clear whether the appropriate standard of review
for this issue is de novo or abuse of discretion.”72 The court so reasoned because:
Last year, our supreme court held: “Whether statements
made by a prosecutor at closing argument were so egregious
that they warrant a new trial is a legal issue this court reviews
de novo.” Wheeler, 226 Ill.2d at 121, 313 Ill.Dec. 1, 871
N.E.2d 728. However, the supreme court in Wheeler cited
with approval People v. Blue, 189 Ill.2d 99, 244 Ill.Dec. 32,
724 N.E.2d 920 (2000), in which the supreme court had previously applied an abuse of discretion standard. [citation
omitted]. In Blue and numerous other cases, our supreme
court had held that the substance and style of closing argument is within the trial court's discretion, and will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. [citations omitted]. Our
supreme court had reasoned: “Because the trial court is in a
better position than a reviewing court to determine the prejudicial effect of any remarks, the scope of closing argument
is within the trial court's discretion.” [citation omitted].
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Palmer, 889 N.E.2d at 252-53 (citing Wheeler, 871 N.E.2d at 744).
People v. Ramos, 920 N.E.2d 504, 507 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st 2009).
Id.
Id. at 510.
People v. Johnson, 898 N.E.2d 658, 675 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st 2008).
Id. at 676-77.
Id. at 675.
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Following Blue and other supreme court cases like it, this
court had consistently applied an abuse of discretion standard. [citations omitted]. Since Wheeler, appellate courts have
been divided regarding the appropriate standard of review.
The First District has applied an abuse of discretion standard, while the Third and Fourth Districts have applied a de
novo standard of review. [citations omitted].73
However, despite thoroughly identifying and describing the division,
the court declined to answer which standard of review should apply.74 The
court so ruled because “we do not need to resolve the issue of the appropriate
standard of review at this time, because our holding in this case would be the
same under either standard.”75
The Fourth and Sixth Divisions of the First District and the Second District have also recognized the division of authority within the Illinois Appellate Court. However, these courts declined to decide which standard of review should apply.76 Rather, under similar fact patterns where the defendant
had failed to properly preserve the issue for appeal, these courts decided that
they “do not need to resolve the issue of the appropriate standard of review .
. . because our holding . . . would be the same under either standard.”77
III. ANALYSIS
This section begins by evaluating the importance of this issue. Next, this
section evaluates the Illinois Supreme Court’s analysis in Wheeler. This section concludes that the Wheeler Court erred when it established de novo as
the standard of review for evaluating alleged prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument. The Wheeler Court erred because the Court undermined established precedent without explicitly overruling or distinguishing
existing case law that previously held that abuse of discretion was the proper
standard of review. This section also concludes that the Illinois Appellate
Court erred in various cases when it subsequently applied an abuse of

73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Johnson, 898 N.E.2d at 675.
76. People v. Anaya, 2017 IL App (1st) 150074, ¶ 46 (“Since Wheeler, appellate
courts have been divided regarding the appropriate standard of review.”); People v. Burman,
986 N.E.2d 1249, 1254 (Ill. App. Ct. 2d 2013); People v. Land, 955 N.E.2d 538, 562 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1st 2011) (“It is not clear whether the appropriate standard of review for this issue is de
novo or abuse of discretion.”).
77. Land, 955 N.E.2d at 563; see People v. Robinson, 909 N.E.2d 232, 250 (Ill. App.
Ct. 2d 2009); see also Anaya, 2017 IL App (1st) 150074, ¶ 46 (“[W]e do not need to resolve
the issue of the appropriate standard of review at this time because our holding in this case
would be the same under either standard.”).
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discretion standard. The Illinois Appellate Court erred because Wheeler, despite its faults, is still binding precedent.
This section will then begin a policy-based evaluation of what standard
of review would be the most desirable when evaluating the propriety of the
State's closing argument. This section concludes that (1) abuse of discretion
review should normally apply to the trial court's determination that a defendant was not substantially prejudiced by the State's closing argument; (2) de
novo review should apply when the trial court's determination turned on a
pure question of law; and (3) the plain error doctrine should apply when the
defendant fails to preserve the issue of whether he was substantially prejudiced by the State's closing argument.
A.

IMPORTANCE OF THIS ISSUE

Currently, the Illinois Appellate Court is still divided over the appropriate standard of review. This matter is of unique importance to defendants
because the outcome of their appeal will often turn on which standard of review is applied.78 When an appellate court reviews an issue de novo, it need
not defer to the trial court's judgment or reasoning.79 Rather, de novo review
is independent of the trial court's decision.80 De novo review is the least deferential standard of review.81 Abuse of discretion, by contrast, is the most
deferential standard of review.82 The reviewing court does not consider
whether it would have made the same decision as the trial court and will only
reverse the trial court's decision if (1) no reasonable person would take the
view adopted by the trial court or (2) the court's ruling was arbitrary, fanciful,
or otherwise unreasonable.83
This matter is also of unique importance to the judiciary. First, a split of
authority within the Illinois Appellate Court is particularly distressing because the law could be applied differently based solely upon geography.84
78. Timothy J. Storm, The Standard of Review Does Matter: Evidence of Judicial
Self-Restrain in the Illinois Appellate Court, 34 S. Ill. U. L. J. 73, 103 (2009).
79. People v. Vincent, 871 N.E.2d 17, 26 (Ill. 2007).
80. Nationwide Advantage Mortg. Co. v. Ortiz, 975 N.E.2d 178, 183 (Ill. App. Ct.
1st 2012).
81. U.S. Steel Corp. v. Ill. Pollution Control Bd., 892 N.E.2d 606, 610 (Ill. App. Ct.
5th 2008).
82. Id.
83. People v. Rivera, 986 N.E.2d 634, 646 (Ill. 2013); Ill. Pollution Control Bd., 892
N.E.2d at 610; 3 ROBERT J. STEIGMANN & LORI NICHOLSON, ILLINOIS EVIDENCE MANUAL §
20:21 (4th ed. 2006) (“[A] court abuses its discretion only when it acts arbitrarily without the
employment of conscious judgment or, in view of all the circumstances, exceeds the bounds
of reason and ignores recognized principles of law, so that no reasonable person would take
the view adopted by it.”).
84. See generally Map of Illinois Judicial Districts, ILL. COURTS (2018), http://illinoiscourts.gov/AppellateCourt/DistrictMap.asp [https://perma.cc/2JVD-95FM].
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For example, under the current split of authority, a defendant in the First District who loses an objection to the State’s closing argument could have his
case decided under the abuse of discretion standard while a similarly situated
defendant in the Third District would have his case decided under de novo
review.85 The Illinois judiciary should strive for uniformity of law throughout
the entire state. Second, as stated earlier, a defendant’s appeal will often turn
on the standard of review that is applied.86 The judiciary must be concerned
about the fundamental fairness of a defendant losing his appeal in the First
District because the appellate court applied an abuse of discretion standard
but a similarly situated defendant in the Third District wins his appeal because the appellate court applied de novo review.87
B.

THE ILLINOIS SUPREME COURT ERRED IN WHEELER

In Wheeler, the Illinois Supreme Court erroneously undermined established precedent. Prior to Wheeler, the Illinois Supreme Court and the Illinois
Appellate Court consistently applied an abuse of discretion standard when
reviewing the State's closing argument.88 For example, in People v. Smothers,
the Illinois Supreme Court reasoned as follows:
The general atmosphere of the trial is observed by the trial
court, and cannot be reproduced in the record on appeal. The
trial court is, therefore, in a better position than a reviewing
court to determine the prejudicial effect, if any, of a remark
made during [closing] argument, and unless [that decision
is] clearly an abuse of discretion, its ruling should be upheld.89
Likewise, in People v. Hudson, the Illinois Supreme Court concluded
that “[b]ecause the trial court is in a better position than a reviewing court to
determine the prejudicial effect of any remarks, the scope of closing
85. Compare Love, 878 N.E.2d at 789 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st 2007) with McCoy, 881
N.E.2d at 633 (Ill. App. Ct. 3d 2008).
86. See Storm, supra note 78, at 103.
87. See generally Julian W. Smith, Note, Evidence of Ambiguity: The Effect of Circuit
Splits on the Interpretation of Federal Criminal Law, 16 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 79,
87-88 (2011).
88. See, e.g., People v. Caffey, 792 N.E.2d 1163, 1210 (Ill. 2001); People v. Williams,
736 N.E.2d 1001, 1020 (Ill. 2000); People v. Emerson, 727 N.E.2d 302, 331 (Ill. 2000); People
v. Armstrong, 700 N.E.2d 960, 966 (Ill. 1998); Byron, 647 N.E.2d at 954; People v. Peeples,
616 N.E.2d 294, 322 (Ill. 1993); People v. Pasch, 604 N.E.2d 294, 315 (Ill. 1992); People v.
Cisewski, 514 N.E.2d 970, 975-76 (Ill. 1987); People v. Smothers, 302 N.E.2d 324, 327 (Ill.
1973); People v. Tolliver, 807 N.E.2d 524, 543 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st 2004); People v. Abadia, 767
N.E.2d 341, 349 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st 2001).
89. Smothers, 302 N.E.2d at 327.
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argument is within the trial court's discretion.”90 In Blue, the Illinois Supreme
Court once again affirmed that “the trial court's determination of the propriety of the remarks [in closing argument] will not be disturbed absent a clear
abuse of discretion.”91
Seemingly unrelated, in People v. Carlson, the Illinois Supreme Court
dealt with whether evidence seized pursuant to a search warrant not authorized by statute was admissible under the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule.92 In deciding this issue, the Court noted that “[w]here only a
question of law is involved, . . . the circuit court's ruling is subject to de novo
review.”93
In People v. Graham, during closing argument, the prosecutor mentioned the defendant's post-arrest silence and mentioned that the defendant
“was smart enough to ask for his lawyer.”94 The defendant failed to object to
this error.95 The Illinois Supreme Court reviewed this argument under the
plain error doctrine.96 Citing to Carlson, the Court held that “[w]e review this
[legal] issue de novo.”97 It was logical to use de novo review in this context
because (1) an appellate court cannot review the trial court for an abuse of
discretion when the trial court did not have an opportunity to exercise that
discretion and (2) mentioning defendant's invocation of his right to remain
silent and his right to an attorney implicated a pure legal issue.98 However,
the Court did not explain the distinction between reviewing a pure legal issue
versus reviewing the trial court's general determination that a defendant was
not substantially prejudiced by the State's closing argument.99

90. People v. Hudson, 626 N.E.2d 161, 178 (Ill. 1993).
91. Blue, 724 N.E.2d at 935 (quoting Byron, 647 N.E.2d at 954).
92. People v. Carlson, 708 N.E.2d 372, 373 (Ill. 1999).
93. Id. at 374.
94. People v. Graham, 795 N.E.2d 231, 237 (Ill. 2003).
95. Id. at 237.
96. Id.
97. Id. (citing Carlson, 708 N.E.2d at 374).
98. See People v. Rivera, 390 N.E.2d 1259, 1266 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st 1979) (defendant
argued that the trial court was unaware of its discretion and, therefore, his case had to be
remanded so the court could exercise its discretion. The appellate court concluded that the trial
court was aware of its discretion.); see Graham, 795 N.E.2d at 237-38 (discussing that the
U.S. Supreme Court held that the prosecution cannot use a defendant's post-Miranda-warning
silence for impeachment purposes without violating due process, Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610,
619 (1976)); see also People v. Burgund, 66 N.E.3d 553, 589 (Ill. App. Ct. 5th 2016) (stating
that, although a trial court's evidentiary rulings are generally reviewed for an abuse of discretion, a ruling on whether a statement is hearsay is a legal question reviewed de novo when the
determination does not involve a fact finding or credibility finding.).
99. See Graham, 795 N.E.2d at 237 (merely stating that the Court would “review this
legal issue de novo.”).
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The Graham Court then applied the plain error doctrine to the defendant's unpreserved claim.100 As stated earlier, this doctrine allows a defendant
to argue an unpreserved error when (1) the evidence is close, regardless of
the seriousness of the error or (2) the error is serious, regardless of the closeness of the evidence.101 The Court concluded that the first prong of the doctrine did not apply because “the State presented strong evidence of the defendant's guilt[.]”102 Likewise, the Court held that the second prong of the
doctrine did not apply because “a comment upon a defendant's post-arrest
silence, while improper, is not an error of such magnitude as to clearly deprive the defendant of a fair trial.”103 Accordingly, the Court rejected the defendant's argument.104
In Wheeler, the prosecutor made improper statements such as the jurors
lived “sheltered lives” and that a different world existed “full of dangerous
people” and “mean streets.”105 The defendant often objected, but the trial
court overruled some objections.106
On appeal, defendant argued that the cumulative effect of these improper statements denied him a right to a fair trial.107 The Illinois Supreme
Court held that defendant preserved the issue for appeal.108 Citing to Graham,
the Court held that “[w]hether statements made by a prosecutor at closing
argument were so egregious that they warrant a new trial is a legal issue this
court reviews de novo.”109 Nonetheless, the Wheeler Court did not explicitly
overrule or distinguish Blue, which held that the style and substance of closing argument is a matter within the trial court's discretion and subject to an
abuse of discretion standard.110 Adding further complexity, the Wheeler
Court cited approvingly to Blue for areas of law other than the standard of
review.111
Based upon this history, it is apparent that Wheeler is an outlier from
traditional Illinois jurisprudence. Graham used de novo review and the plain
100. Graham, 795 N.E.2d at 238.
101. Herron, 830 N.E.2d at 479-80.
102. Graham, 795 N.E.2d at 238.
103. Id.
104. See id.
105. Wheeler, 871 N.E.2d at 748-49; see generally Bennett L. Gershman, Prosecutorial Ethics and Victims' Rights: The Prosecutor's Duty of Neutrality, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L.
REV. 559 (2005).
106. Wheeler, 871 N.E.2d at 748-49.
107. Id. at 731.
108. Id. at 744-45 (noting that defendant properly preserved some of the improper
closing arguments and that the court would then consider the entirety of the prosecutor’s closing statement).
109. Wheeler, 871 N.E.2d at 744 (citing Graham, 795 N.E.2d at 235).
110. See Wheeler, 871 N.E.2d at 744.
111. See id. at 744, 749.
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error doctrine for reviewing prosecutorial misconduct when the improper
statements involved a pure legal issue.112 However, Graham did not make an
explicit distinction between reviewing a pure legal issue, which should be
subject to de novo review, and reviewing the trial court's determination about
the substance and style of closing argument, which was traditionally reviewed for an abuse of discretion.113
Wheeler, which cited to Graham, concluded that de novo review was
appropriate when reviewing the propriety of the State's closing argument.114
However, Wheeler was factually different from Graham because (1) the defendant in Wheeler objected to the statements at trial while the defendant in
Graham did not object and (2) Graham dealt with a pure legal issue.115
The Wheeler Court also failed to overrule or distinguish Blue, which
held that an abuse of discretion standard was the proper standard of review.116
Causing further confusion, Wheeler cited Blue with approval for other areas
of law.117 Therefore, the Illinois Supreme Court undermined established
precedent and caused confusion within the Illinois Appellate Court.118
C.

AS A MATTER OF LAW, DE NOVO REVIEW APPLIES

Although Wheeler represents a deviation from traditional Illinois jurisprudence, it is still binding precedent.119 Thus, de novo review applies when
an appellate court reviews alleged prosecutorial misconduct during closing
argument.120 As such, the First and Third Divisions of the First District erred
when they applied an abuse of discretion standard. Likewise, the Fourth and
Sixth Divisions of the First District and the Second District should have applied de novo review rather than avoiding the issue merely because their conclusion in a particular case “would be the same under either standard.”121

112. Graham, 795 N.E.2d at 237 (citing Carlson, 708 N.E.2d at 372).
113. See Graham, 795 N.E.2d at 237 (“We review this legal issue de novo.”); see Burgund, 66 N.E.3d at 589 (stating that, although a trial court's evidentiary rulings are generally
reviewed for an abuse of discretion, a ruling on whether a statement is hearsay is a legal question reviewed de novo); Blue, 724 N.E.2d at 935 (“the trial court's determination of the propriety of the remarks will not be disturbed absent a clear abuse of discretion.”).
114. Wheeler, 871 N.E.2d at 744.
115. Compare Wheeler, 871 N.E.2d at 745 (“we will focus our attention on the statements properly objected to.”) with Graham, 795 N.E.2d 231 at 237-38 (“defendant forfeited
review of this issue because he never objected to . . . the State's argument at trial and in a posttrial motion.”).
116. Wheeler, 871 N.E.2d at 744 (citing Graham, 795 N.E.2d at 231).
117. Wheeler, 871 N.E.2d at 744, 749.
118. See Green, 2017 IL App (1st) 152513, ¶ 79.
119. Palmer, 889 N.E.2d at 251.
120. Wheeler, 871 N.E.2d at 744.
121. Land, 955 N.E.2d at 563; Robinson, 909 N.E.2d at 249-50.
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AS A MATTER OF POLICY, WHAT STANDARD OF REVIEW SHOULD
APPLY?

Although de novo review is the legal standard under current Illinois law,
this article will now examine, as a matter of policy, which standard of review
would be most desirable.122 This subsection will discuss (1) de novo review,
(2) abuse of discretion review, (3) manifest weight of the evidence review,
and (4) review of mixed questions of law and fact. Similarly, this subsection
will discuss the plain error doctrine. This subsection will also evaluate the
standard of review for examining the propriety of closing statements under
Illinois civil law and federal criminal law.
Ultimately, this subsection concludes that (1) abuse of discretion review
should generally apply to the trial court's determination that a defendant was
not substantially prejudiced by the State's closing argument; (2) de novo review should apply when the trial court's determination turned on a pure question of law; and (3) the plain error doctrine should apply when the defendant
fails to preserve the issue of whether he was substantially prejudiced by the
State's closing argument.
1. De Novo Review
De novo review is the least deferential towards the trial court.123 When
an appellate court reviews an issue de novo, it performs an independent analysis of the issue.124 Generally, de novo review applies for questions of law or
to the application of law to undisputed facts.125
De novo review of legal issues is appropriate because the appellate court
is in a superior position to determine the law.126 For example, trial judges
devote most of their time to managing and determining the facts of a case
and must regularly resolve legal issues without time for exhaustive legal research.127 Conversely, appellate justices devote their primary attention to legal issues.128 In addition, a trial judge usually decides a legal issue without
122. See Timothy P. O'Neill & Susan L. Brody, Taking Standards of Appellate Review
Seriously: A Proposal to Amend Rule 341, 83 ILL. B. J. 512, 513 (1995).
123. Ill. Pollution Control Bd., 892 N.E.2d at 610.
124. Ortiz, 975 N.E.2d at 183.
125. Burgund, 66 N.E.3d at 589.
126. See Kathleen L. Coles, Mixed Up Questions of Fact and Law: Illinois Standards
of Appellate Review in Civil Cases Following the 1997 Amendment to Supreme Court Rule
341, 28 S. ILL. U. L. J. 13, 38 (2003).
127. Dan T. Coenen, To Defer or Not To Defer: A Study of Federal Circuit Court
Deference to District Court Rulings on State Law, 73 MINN. L. REV. 899, 922-28 (1989); Peter
J. Kocoras, Comment, The Proper Appellate Standard of Review for Probable Cause to Issue
a Search Warrant, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 1413, 1418 (1993).
128. See Coles, supra note 126, at 40; see also United States v. McConney, 728 F.2d
1195, 1201 (9th Cir. 1982).
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consulting other judges or law clerks.129 On the other hand, a panel on the
Illinois Appellate Court is comprised of three justices and requires a majority
vote to decide a legal issue.130 Further, each appellate justice has several law
clerks to perform additional legal research.131
2. Abuse of Discretion Review
Abuse of discretion is the most deferential standard of review.132 Under
an abuse of discretion standard, the reviewing court does not conduct an independent analysis of the issue and will only reverse the trial court's decision
if (1) no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court or
(2) the trial court's ruling was arbitrary, fanciful, or otherwise unreasonable.133
Generally, abuse of discretion review applies to decisions by a trial
judge in overseeing the courtroom or in maintaining the progress of a trial.134
For example, the abuse of discretion standard applies to a trial court's relevancy determination, a trial court's evidentiary rulings, a trial court's ruling
on a motion in liminie, a trial court's ruling on a motion for a new trial, a trial
court's limitation on cross-examination, and other courtroom procedures.135
The abuse of discretion standard serves important policy goals. First,
trial judges are entrusted to maintain court order, and appellate courts must
be deferential to the trial court's methods.136 Second, by applying the abuse
of discretion standard, the appellate court saves judicial resources because it
is relieved from conducting an exhaustive and independent review of the proceeding.137 Finally, because the trial judge actually observed the proceeding,
the trial court is in a better position to rule on these issues.138

129. See Coles, supra note 126, at 38-44.
130. See id. at 39; see also Peter Nicolas, De Novo Review In Deferential Robes?: A
Deconstruction of the Standard of Review of Evidentiary Errors in the Federal System, 54
SYRACUSE L. REV. 531, 532-35 (2004).
131. Kocoras, supra note 127, at 1418.
132. Id.
133. Rivera, 986 N.E.2d at 646; see Martha S. Davis, Standards of Review: Judicial
Review of Discretionary Decisionmaking, 2 J. APP. PRAC. & PROC. 47, 49-51 (2000); see also
Mark P. Painter & Paula L. Welker, Abuse of Discretion: What Should It Mean Under Ohio
Law?, 29 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 209, 219-22 (2002).
134. Ill. Pollution Control Bd., 892 N.E.2d at 609.
135. STEIGMANN & NICHOLSON, supra note 83, § 20:21.
136. See generally People v. Boose, 362 N.E.2d 303, 304-07 (Ill. 1977).
137. Timothy P. O'Neill, Standards of Review in Illinois Criminal Cases: The Need
for Major Reform, 17 S. ILL. U. L. J. 51, 55 (1992).
138. Hudson, 626 N.E.2d at 178; see also Alisa J. Baker, Conduct of the Trial Judge,
71 GEO. L. J. 627, 627-28 (1982).
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3. Manifest Weight of the Evidence Review
The manifest weight of the evidence standard applies to factual findings
made by the trial court.139 A factual finding is against the manifest weight of
the evidence only if (1) the opposite conclusion is clearly evident or (2) the
finding itself is unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on the evidence.140
When the evidence is merely conflicting, a reviewing court will not substitute
its judgment for that of the trial court.141
Manifest weight of the evidence is appropriate because the trial court,
rather than a reviewing court, is in a better position to determine the facts of
a case.142 The trial court is in a better position to determine the facts of a case
because it had the opportunity to observe the witnesses first hand, listen to
their testimony, judge their credibility, and observe their nonverbal communications. Nonverbal communication is especially important in determining
the credibility of a witness.143 Furthermore, as aptly described by Justice
Robert J. Steigmann, the record on appeal cannot adequately convey the “paralanguage” that the trial court hears:
Spoken language contains more communicative information
than the mere words because spoken language contains “paralanguage”—that is, the “vocal signs perceptible to the human ear that are not actual words.” [citation omitted]. Paralanguage includes “quality of voice . . . , variations in pitch,
intonation, stress, emphasis, breathiness, volume, extent . . .
, hesitations or silent pauses, filled pauses or speech fillers .
. . , the rate of speech, and extra-speech sounds such as hissing, shushing, whistling, and [other] sounds.” [citation omitted]. The information expressed through paralanguage is
139. Shulte v. Flowers, 983 N.E.2d 1124, 1128 (Ill. App. Ct. 4th 2013).
140. People v. Holman, 937 N.E.2d 196, 199 (Ill. App. Ct. 2d 2010); see Richard H.
W. Maloy, 'Standards of Review'-Just A Tip of the Icicle, 77 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 603, 639
(2000).
141. People v. Downin, 828 N.E.2d 341, 349 (Ill. App. Ct. 3d 2005); see Brad A. Elward, Workers' Compensation Reviews and Appeals: A Review and Suggestion for Change,
22 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 493, 506 (2002).
142. Burnett v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Ill., 590 N.E.2d 1032, 1039 (Ill. App. Ct. 5th 1992).
143. Jaclyn M. D'Esposito, Note, The Role of Nonverbal Persuasion in Juror DecisionMaking and the Need to Regulate the Trial Consulting Industry, 30 NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHICS
& PUB. POL’Y 143, 172-73 (2016); Hon. James P. Timony, Demeanor Credibility, 49 CATH.
U. L. REV. 903, 942-43 (2000); Lance Stockwell & David C. Schrader, Factors That Persuade
Jurors, 27 U. TOL. L. REV. 99, 99-103 (1996); Jeremy A. Blumenthal, A Wipe of the Hands, A
Lick of the Lips: The Validity of Demeanor Evidence in Assessing Witness Credibility, 72 NEB.
L. REV. 1157, 1204 (1993); Captain Jeffrey D. Smith, The Advocate's Use of Social Science
Research into Nonverbal and Verbal Communication: Zealous Advocacy or Unethical Conduct?, 134 MIL. L. REV. 173, 193 (1991).
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rarely included in the transcript, as there is generally no written counterpart for these features of speech.144
4. Review of Mixed Question of Law and Fact
Courts apply a bifurcated standard of review when reviewing mixed
questions of law and fact.145 The appellate court will not reverse the trial
court's factual findings unless those findings are against the manifest weight
of the evidence.146 A finding is against the manifest weight of the evidence
only if the opposite conclusion is apparent or if the finding itself is unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on the evidence presented.147 Nonetheless, the
trial court's ultimate ruling based on those facts is reviewed de novo.148
The Illinois Supreme Court has described this standard of review as “lying between the manifest weight of the evidence standard and a de novo
standard, so as to provide ‘some deference’ to the [trial court]'s decision.”149
Appellate courts apply this deferential standard because the trial court is in a
better position to determine and weigh the evidence presented at trial.150
5. The Civil and Federal Standard
In civil cases in the state of Illinois, improper comments during closing
argument require reversal only when the comments are so prejudicial as to
deprive the other party of the right to a fair trial.151 Issues concerning the
prejudicial effect of these comments are within the sound discretion of the
trial court and will not be reversed absent a clear abuse of discretion.152
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, whose district includes the state of Illinois, first considers whether a prosecutor's statements were improper.153 If improper, the court then considers whether the
statements, considering their context and the entire record, deprived the
144. People v. Hadden, 44 N.E.3d 681, 685-86 (Ill. App. Ct. 4th 2015) (citing Keith
A. Gorgos, Lost in Transcription: Why the Video Record is Actually Verbatim, 57 BUFF. L.
REV. 1057, 1107 (2009)).
145. Rivera, 879 N.E.2d at 882; see also Randal H. Warner, All Mixed Up About Mixed
Questions, 7 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 101, 102 (2005).
146. Rivera, 879 N.E.2d at 882.
147. People v. Mott, 906 N.E.2d 159, 163-64 (Ill. App. Ct. 4th 2009).
148. Id. at 162-63.
149. AFM Messenger Serv., Inc. v. Dep’t of Emp’t Sec., 763 N.E.2d 272, 280 (Ill.
2001); see also Mixed Questions of Law and Fact, 110 HARV. L. REV. 317, 317-18 (1996).
150. See People v. Pitman, 813 N.E.2d 93, 100 (Ill. 2004); see also Edward J. Walters,
Jr. & Darrel J. Papillion, Appellate Review of Mixed Questions of Law and Fact: Due Deference to the Fact Finder, 60 LA. L. REV. 541, 541-42 (2000).
151. Zickuhr v. Ericsson, Inc., 962 N.E.2d 974, 990 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st 2011).
152. Id.
153. United States v. Sandoval, 347 F.3d 627, 631 (7th Cir. 2003).
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defendant of a fair trial.154 When a defendant objects to a prosecutor's comments during closing argument, the trial court's ruling will be reversed only
for an abuse of discretion.155
6. The Plain Error Doctrine
To properly preserve a claim for review, a defendant must object to a
perceived error during trial and in a post-trial motion.156 If a defendant fails
to properly preserve a claim, the purported error is forfeited for appellate review.157
The plain error doctrine is an exception to the forfeiture rule.158 Under
this doctrine, an appellate court may exercise its discretion and review a forfeited issue when (1) a clear or obvious error occurred and the evidence is so
closely balanced that the error alone threatened to tip the scales of justice
against the defendant, regardless of the seriousness of the error or (2) when
a clear or obvious error occurred and that error is so serious that it affected
the fundamental fairness of the defendant's trial and challenged the integrity
of the judicial process, regardless of the closeness of the evidence.159
The initial step under the plain error doctrine is to determine whether
the defendant proved that a plain error even occurred.160 Alternatively, if the
defendant is arguing that the evidence was closely balanced, the court could
begin by analyzing whether the defendant proved that the evidence was
closely balanced.161 If the court determines that the evidence is not closely
balanced, it need not determine whether an error occurred.
Plain is synonymous with a “clear” or “obvious” error.162 If the reviewing court determines that no clear or obvious error occurred, the issue is forfeited and the court will honor the procedural default.163 If the reviewing
court determines that a clear or obvious error occurred, it proceeds to the
second step of the analysis: which is to determine whether the plain error
requires reversal. 164
When the defendant claims first-prong error, a reviewing court must decide whether the defendant has shown that the evidence was so closely balanced that the plain error alone severely threatened to tip the scales of justice
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

Id.
Id.
Love, 878 N.E.2d at 795.
Sebby, 89 N.E.3d at 687.
Herron, 830 N.E.2d at 479.
Sebby, 89 N.E.3d at 687.
People v. Tademy, 30 N.E.3d 1134, 1138 (Ill. App. Ct. 3d 2015).
People v. Belknap, 23 N.E.3d 325, 340 (Ill. 2014).
Tademy, 30 N.E.3d at 1138.
People v. Bowens, 943 N.E.2d 1249, 1262 (Ill. App. Ct. 4th 2011).
Id.
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against him.165 In determining if the evidence was close, a reviewing court
must evaluate the totality of the evidence and conduct a qualitative, commonsense assessment of it within the context of the case.166 If defendant
meets this burden, he has demonstrated actual prejudice and his conviction
should be reversed.167
When the defendant claims second-prong error, he must prove that a
structural error occurred.168 A structural error is an error which renders a
criminal trial fundamentally unfair or unreliable in determining a defendant's
guilt or innocence.169 Structural errors occur in very limited circumstances
such as a complete denial of counsel, denial of self-representation at trial,
trial before a biased judge, denial of a public trial, racial discrimination in the
selection of a grand jury, and a defective reasonable doubt instruction.170
The defendant bears the burden of persuasion at all times.171 If the defendant fails to meet his burden under the plain error doctrine, the issue is
forfeited and the reviewing court will honor the procedural default.172
The policy behind the forfeiture rule is to limit the scope of an appeal to
the issues that were considered significant by the parties at trial and to ensure
that the trial court had an opportunity to correct those errors during trial.173
Likewise, the forfeiture doctrine ensures that a defendant does not obtain a
reversal through inaction at the trial court level.174 The forfeiture rule also
lessens the burden on the appellate court.175
The policy behind the plain error doctrine is to ensure that the rights of
a defendant are protected and to insure the integrity of the judicial process.176
165. Sebby, 89 N.E.3d at 688.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. People v. Garcia, 942 N.E.2d 700, 710 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st 2011).
169. Bowens, 943 N.E.2d at 1258-59.
170. People v. Averett, 927 N.E.2d 1191, 1198 (Ill. 2010).
171. Herron, 830 N.E.2d at 473.
172. People v. Ahlers, 931 N.E.2d 1249, 1255 (Ill. App. Ct. 4th 2010).
173. Steven W. Becker, To Review or Not to Review: The Plain Truth About Illinois'
Plain Error Rule, 37 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 455, 458-59 (2006); Larry Cunningham, Appellate
Review of Unpreserved Questions in Criminal Cases: An Attempt to Define the “Interest of
Justice,” 11 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 285, 285-86 (2010).
174. People v. Denson, 21 N.E.3d 398, 401 (Ill. 2014); Robert J. Martineau, Considering New Issues On Appeal: The General Rule and the Gorilla Rule, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1023,
1029-30 (1987).
175. Edward Goolsby, Comment, Why So Serious? Taking the Word “Seriously”
More Seriously in Plain Error Review of Federal Sentencing Appeals, 51 HOUS. L. REV. 1449,
1454-56 (2014); see Robert W. Cook, An Appellate Justice's Quick Guide to Appeals, 97 ILL.
B.J. 132, 133-35 (2009).
176. Becker, supra note 173, at 458-59 (quoting Herron, 830 N.E.2d at 474); see Jon
M. Woodruff, Note, Plain Error By Another Name: Are Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Claims a Suitable Alternative to Plain Error Review in Iowa?, 102 IOWA L. REV. 1811, 181319 (2017); see Tory A. Weigand, Raise or Lose: Appellate Discretion and Principled
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Although the plain error doctrine is not based on constitutional law, it “has
roots in the same soil as due process.”177
E.

POLICY CONCLUSIONS

As a matter of policy, this subsection concludes that (1) abuse of discretion review should normally apply to the trial court's determination that a
defendant was not substantially prejudiced by the State's closing argument;
(2) de novo review should apply when the trial court's determination turned
on a pure question of law; and (3) the plain error doctrine should apply when
the defendant fails to preserve the issue of whether he was substantially prejudiced by the State's closing argument.
1. Normally, Abuse of Discretion Review Should Apply
Normally, abuse of discretion is the optimal standard of review for evaluating whether the trial court erred when determining that a defendant was
not substantially prejudiced by the State's closing argument. First, the abuse
of discretion standard is normally applied to a trial court's management of the
courtroom, which would traditionally include closing statements.178 Second,
the trial judge is in a better position to determine the prejudicial effect, if any,
from allegedly improper closing statements because the reviewing court can
only examine the cold record while the trial judge had the opportunity to
observe closing arguments firsthand and observe how the jury reacted.179
Moreover, the nonverbal communication of how the jury reacted to the
State's closing argument, which cannot be reproduced on appeal, is of utmost
importance in determining if prejudice resulted from an allegedly improper
closing argument.180 Third, in this context, adopting abuse of discretion review for prosecutorial misconduct in closing statements would bring Illinois
criminal law in harmony with Illinois civil law and federal criminal law. Finally, adopting an abuse of discretion standard would save judicial resources
because the reviewing court would be relieved of conducting an exhaustive
factual review.181 Hence, abuse of discretion is usually the best standard.
Decision-Making, 17 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 179, 192-93 (2012); see Robert J. Labrum, Comment, History and Application of the Plain Error Doctrine in Utah, 2000 UTAH L.
REV. 537, 551 (2000).
177. Becker, supra note 173 at 458-59; see also Morton Gitelman, The Plain Error
Rule In Arkansas—Plainly Time for a Change, 53 ARK. L. REV. 205, 206-07 (2000).
178. See Hudson, 626 N.E.2d at 178.
179. People v. Patterson, 25 N.E.3d 526, 538 (Ill. 2014); see also Hadden, 44 N.E.3d
at 684-85.
180. See Keith A. Gorgos, Lost in Transcription: Why the Video Record is Actually
Verbatim, 57 BUFF. L. REV. 1057, 1107 (2009).
181. See Coles, supra note 126, at 40.
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At first glance, reviewing the propriety of closing arguments as a mixed
question of law and fact seems appropriate. This standard would be practical
because the appellate court would largely defer to the trial court's factual
findings but would conduct an independent review of the trial court's legal
conclusion.182 However, although Illinois courts have applied this standard
in other contexts, it has never been applied to reviewing the propriety of closing arguments. Accordingly, as a matter of stare decisis, this standard of review is not appropriate. Further, adopting this standard would not align Illinois criminal law with Illinois civil law and federal criminal law.
However, as a matter of policy, de novo review is generally not appropriate for reviewing the trial court’s determination of the propriety of closing
arguments. De novo review is traditionally reserved for reviewing legal conclusions, and reviewing the propriety of closing arguments is usually fact
intensive.183 Moreover, the trial court, rather than the appellate court, is in a
better position to make the determination of whether closing arguments substantially prejudiced a defendant.184 Thus, de novo review is not deferential
enough to the trial court's determination.
Finally, manifest weight of the evidence is not appropriate for reviewing
the trial court's determination that a defendant was not substantially prejudiced by the State's closing argument. Although closing arguments are fact
intensive, determining whether a defendant was substantially prejudiced by
the State's closing argument is not a pure factual determination.185
2. De Novo Should Apply for a Pure Question of Law
De novo review should apply when (1) the defendant properly preserved
the issue of whether he was substantially prejudiced by the State's closing
argument and (2) the trial court's determination of whether he was substantially prejudiced turned on a pure question of law.
De novo is appropriate in this circumstance because the appellate court
is in a better position than the trial court to determine the law.186 Furthermore,
a reviewing court can efficiently review the record to determine if the trial
court made a legal error. Moreover, even for areas of law that are normally
subject to an abuse of discretion review, de novo review is applied when the
determination is a pure matter of law. For example, a trial court's evidentiary
rulings are normally reviewed for an abuse of discretion; but a ruling on
whether a statement is hearsay is reviewed de novo when the determination
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

Rivera, 879 N.E.2d at 882.
Smothers, 302 N.E.2d at 326.
Id.
See Wheeler, 871 N.E.2d at 744.
See Coles, supra note 126, at 38.
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does not involve fact or credibility finding.187 Likewise, evidentiary rulings
involving questions of statutory interpretation are reviewed de novo.188 Accordingly, if a trial court's determination that a defendant was not prejudiced
by the State's closing argument turned on a matter of law, de novo review is
appropriate.
3. The Plain Error Doctrine Should Apply When Defendant Fails
to Preserve the Issue
Finally, when a defendant fails to properly preserve the issue of whether
he was substantially prejudiced by the State's closing argument, appellate
courts should evaluate this issue under the plain error doctrine. Under this
doctrine, the court should determine whether the defendant met his burden of
showing that a clear or obvious error occurred and that (1) the evidence was
so closely balanced that the error alone threatened to tip the scales of justice
against him or (2) the error was so serious that it affected the fundamental
fairness of his trial. It is important to note that the plain error doctrine is not
a standard of review in a typical sense. However, by emphasizing that the
burden is on the defendant, courts can affirm a conviction because the defendant failed to meet his burden. This is a different analytical framework
than affirming a conviction because the trial court did not err or because the
trial court did not abuse its discretion. Thus, the plain error doctrine serves
as a de facto standard of review.189
Under this doctrine, the reviewing court could affirm a conviction under
a variety of ways. First, the court could determine that the defendant failed
to prove that a clear or obvious error occurred. This is because courts allow
prosecutors wide latitude when delivering closing argument and trial judges
often cure any potential prejudice by sustaining objections and instructing
the jury on the law. Likewise, if a defendant objected to the statements at trial
but neglected to file a post-trial motion, a reviewing court could easily determine that the defendant failed to prove that the trial court's denial of his objection was an abuse of discretion. Alternatively, when the trial court's ruling
or the prosecutor's statements involved a pure question of law, the defendant
could often prove that a clear or obvious error occurred.
Second, when defendant is arguing first prong error, the court could
simply determine that the evidence was not closely balanced. If the evidence
187. People v. Steele, 19 N.E.3d 1084, 1095 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st 2014).
188. People v. Learn, 919 N.E.2d 1042, 1048 (Ill. App. Ct. 2d 2009).
189. Compare Herron, 830 N.E.2d at 475 n.1 (“The plain-error test, in both its federal
and state formulas, is more aptly described as a standard to help a reviewing court determine
when to excuse forfeiture.”) with People v. Bean, 560 N.E.2d 258, 264 (Ill. 1990) (“Our standard of review on this issue is that of the plain error doctrine, for defendant did not raise this
issue either through a trial objection or in his post-trial motion.”).
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is not closely balanced, the court need not determine whether an error occurred.
Finally, if a defendant argues that the State's closing statements was second prong error, the court could summarily reject that argument except in
extreme cases.190
Nonetheless, when a slight error does occur, the first prong of the plain
error doctrine would be sufficient to ensure that the rights of the defendant
are protected. Likewise, in the event of an egregious breakdown of the adversarial system, the second prong of the plain error doctrine could theoretically apply.
IV. CONCLUSION
As the law currently stands, the Illinois Appellate Court must apply de
novo review when evaluating whether the State's closing argument substantially prejudiced a defendant. Wheeler, despite its faults, is binding precedent
in the state of Illinois.
V. RECOMMENDATION
The Illinois Supreme Court must resolve this division within the Illinois
Appellate Court. This matter is of unique importance to criminal defendants
and the Illinois Appellate Court has shown little interest in decisively settling
this issue.191 When resolving this division, the Illinois Supreme Court should
conclude that (1) abuse of discretion review should normally apply to the
trial court's determination that a defendant was not substantially prejudiced
by the State's closing argument; (2) de novo review should apply when the
trial court's determination turned on a pure question of law; and (3) the plain
error doctrine should apply when the defendant fails to preserve the issue of
whether he was substantially prejudiced by the State's closing argument.
Adopting this three-pronged approach would clarify Illinois law and serve
important policy goals.

190. See People v. Adams, 962 N.E.2d 410, 416 (Ill. 2012) (noting that the prosecutor's
improper speculation during closing argument was not so serious that it affected the fundamental fairness of the defendant's trial or challenged the integrity of the judicial process);
People v. Shaw, 52 N.E.3d 728, 741-45 (Ill. App. Ct. 4th 2016) (prosecutor's statement that
defendant would not have resisted the police if he only had cannabis were not so serious that
they affected the fundamental fairness of defendant's trial or challenged the integrity of the
judicial process).
191. See, e.g., People v. Austin, 79 N.E.3d 312, 323 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st 2017); People v.
Sandifer, 65 N.E.3d 969, 983 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st 2016); Burman, 986 N.E.2d at 1254; Land, 955
N.E.2d at 563; Robinson, 909 N.E.2d at 249-50.

